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Reading Hiromatsu’s Theory of the Fourfold Structure
Hiromatsu Wataru’s philosophical thought revolves around an analy­
sis of what he calls the “fourfold structure.” According to Hiromatsu, all 
phenomena in the world are structured in such a fourfold manner that 
“a given presents itself as something to someone as Someone,” and these 
four moments of the phenomenon are not independent elements, but 
exist only as terms of the functional relationship. This paper surveys and 
critically examines this theory of the fourfold structure, and shows, in par­
ticular, how this theory, while largely presented as synchronic structural 
analysis, contains some conceptual motifs going beyond the synchronic 
framework. Specifically, with a focus on the process in which there arises a 
meaning common to different phenomenal givens and to different know­
ers, my analysis suggests the way in which phenomena are dynamically 









Hiromatsu Wataru 廣松 渉 (1933–1994) describes the basic motif of his philosophy as a systematic critique of the “modern worldview” 
(近代的世界観), which he characterizes as ontologically “substantialist” and 
epistemologically bound by the “subject/object schema.”1 Inspired by the 
thought of Karl Marx and Marxism as well as by the philosophical impli­
cations of twentieth­century physical science,2 he strives to replace the 
modern worldview with a new philosophical orientation marked by “the 
primacy of relation” and what he calls the intersubjective “fourfold struc­
ture” (四肢構造).3
In this article, I will survey and critically examine Hiromatsu’s general 
philosophical theory of the fourfold structure.4 As Hiromatsu notes, this 
theory is largely developed as a “synchronic” structural analysis of the phe­
nomenal world.5 A closer reading will show, however, that his texts contain 
some lines of thought that differ from, and stand in latent tension with, his 
overall synchronic approach. In the first section, I outline his theory of the 
fourfold structure in its primarily synchronic framework. I then set out to 
analyze this theory and show how his synchronic framework may be sur­
1. hwc 1: 13, 15: xvii.
2. Hiromatsu’s systematic philosophy goes hand in hand with his novel interpretation of 
Marx’s thought. In the present study, however, except for referring to part of his reading of 
Marx in the second section, I will not enter into this area of his scholarship. For a discussion of 
Hiromatsu’s analysis of Marx’s theory of the commodity, see Katsumori 2016b. For a study 
of his approach to modern physical science (specifically, Ernst Mach’s thought and Einstein’s 
relativity theory), see Katsumori 2016a. 
3. hwc 15: xiii, xviii.
4. Major prior inquiries into Hiromatsu’s theory of the fourfold structure include chapter 3 
of Kobayashi 1987 and part 2 of Kumano 2004. In the present study, however, I do not enter 
into these or other authors’ readings of his philosophy.
5. hwc 1: 29.
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passed by some of his dynamic conceptual motifs. More specifically, in the 
second section, I investigate the structuring of the known side of phenom­
ena, and, in the third, the fourfold structuring of phenomena, with a focus 
on what may be called the dynamic displacement of meanings and cognitive 
roles. 
An overview of the theory of  
the fourfold structure6
Hiromatsu’s overall philosophical project revolves around the the­
ory of the fourfold structure, which he developed in his 1972 book The Inter-
subjective Being-Structure of the World『世界の共同主観的存在構造』and 
several subsequent works, most systematically in Being and Meaning『存在
と意味』, vol. 1 (1982) and vol. 2 (1993). This theory begins with a structural 
analysis of phenomena “as they unfold cognitively.”7 For Hiromatsu, the cog­
nitive aspect of the world, or the world “in a provisional abstraction from 
such moments as practical significance or value significance,” has no prior­
ity over the practical, but is rather just a “structural moment or perspectival 
cross section” of the latter.8 Yet, in order to confront effectively the modern 
philosophical tradition, which has primarily been concerned with the cog­
nitive dimension, he finds it convenient to start with this dimension.9 His 
philosophy thus sets out to analyze the cognitive aspect of the phenomenal 
world—“the world as it appears to pre­reflective consciousness.”10 In the 
present study, I largely restrict myself to this part of his work engaging with 
the cognitive dimension.
Hiromatsu rejects the modern subject/object schema, which underlies 
the realist copy theory as well as various kinds of idealism, and—up to a 
point following Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism—conceives phenomena as 
neither simply subjective nor purely objective, but prior to the very divi­
6. A large part of this section has been adapted from a section of Katsumori 2016a, 168–75.
7. hwc 15: xvii.
8. hwc 15: 5, vii.
9. The first and the second volumes of Being and Meaning are devoted to an analysis of the 
cognitive and the practical dimensions, respectively.
10. hwc 1: 30.
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sion of subject and object. However, he breaks with Machian phenomenal­
ism insofar as it fails to grasp the “meaningful moment” of phenomena.11 
Rather, in a manner reminiscent of phenomenology, he emphasizes that all 
phenomena “bear meaning,” or, in other words, that they appear as some­
thing. As he explains it:
The phenomenon always already appears in itself as something more than 
a mere “sensuous” (感性的) given. The sound that is just heard appears 
intuitively as a car horn; what is seen outside the window appears as a pine 
tree. When I see a thing that lies on the desk, I am aware of it directly as a 
“pencil.”12
This applies not only to perceptions, but to all kinds of phenomena, 
includ ing representations as well as linguistically mediated judgments.13 
All these phenomena appear as something more or something other than 
“the phenomenal given” (現相的所与).14 Put differently, the phenomenon 
is such that, “in showing itself…, it always already shows something else.”15 
Hiromatsu designates this something more or something else as “the mean­
ingful cognized” (意味的所識)” or simply the “meaning.”16 Any phenom­
enon thus consists of these two factors, given and meaning, linked to each 
other in such a way that the former appears as the latter. If we denote the 
phenomenal given by p and the meaningful cognized by [p], the phenom­
enon is structured in the form of “p as [p].”17
11. hwc 3: 546. See Katsumori 2016a, 158.
12. hwc 1: 33.
13. In what follows in the text, while treating not only nonverbal perceptions and 
representations but also linguistic signs, I will not directly enter into Hiromatsu’s thematic 
discussion of language, specifically his analysis of judgment (see hwc 1: 47ff., 15: 281ff.).
14. hwc 15: 39.
15. hwc 1: 34.
16. hwc 15: 39, 1: 35. In his early works, Hiromatsu used the term 意味的所知 (the meaningful 
known) instead of 意味的所識, thus giving rise to a double meaning of 所知: as against the 
knower (能知) and as against the given (所与). To remove this ambiguity, he introduced in Being 
and Meaning, vol. 1, the neologism 所識 (the cognized), while reserving 所知for what comprises 
both given and cognized (or meaning) (see hwc 15: xxvii). The words 所知 and 所識 are hardly 
distinguishable, however, in terms of the intrinsic meanings of the component characters.
17. This expression is based on a notation that Hiromatsu introduced in his graduation thesis 
(hwc 16) and later used in his analysis of Marx’s theory of the commodity. More specifically, he 
employs the expression “a as [a]” for the relation between what Marx calls use­value and value 
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This twofold or dual character of the phenomenon, Hiromatsu contin­
ues, is “manifest most typically in the case of signs,” such as a series of sounds 
or ink stains appearing as a meaningful word. Yet this twofoldness is not 
unique to what are commonly called signs, but, conversely, all phenomena 
are, in a sense, “of a signitive (symbolic) character.”18 It is precisely by virtue 
of this general character of phenomena that signs in the narrow sense can 
function as signs. From this point of view, borrowing terms of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s linguistics, Hiromatsu renames the phenomenal given the “signi­
fier” and the meaningful cognized the “signified.”19
While emphasizing the duality of phenomena, Hiromatsu in no way 
maintains a dualism of mutually independent terms. On the contrary, he 
seeks to de­substantialize the two moments of phenomena by what may, in a 
sense, be characterized as an extension of the Saussurean views of signs to all 
phenomena.20 First, he argues that not only are all phenomena meaningful, 
but also any meaning (or signified) exists only to the extent that it is tied to, 
or, as it were, is “incarnated” in a phenomenal given (or signifier).21 In other 
words, far from being self­contained, both the given and the meaning can 
be what they are only in their interrelation. Second, Hiromatsu points to 
the differential character of meaning: It is not that the meaning a is distin­
guished from non­a because of a’s independent self­identity, but that “a is 
taken… as self­identical insofar as it is distinguished from non­a.”22 In this 
way, with regard both to the relation between given and meaning and to 
the relation between different meanings, he offers a radically “relationist” 
account, rejecting the reifying notion of meaning as self­contained.
Hiromatsu goes on to determine more closely the character of the mean­
ingful cognized. Meaning is, he maintains, neither a “real object” referred 
of commodities, which, in Hiromatsu’s view, exemplify two factors of the phenomenon in the 
practical domain, corresponding respectively to given and meaning under discussion here (see 
hwc 12: 148).
18. hwc 1: 34.
19. hwc 15: 149.
20. On the other hand, Hiromatsu criticizes Saussure for presupposing the dichotomy of 
things and ideas, and conceiving signs as psychical entities (Maruyama and Hiromatsu 
1993, 22ff.).
21. hwc 1: 36.
22. hwc 15: 26.
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to, nor a “mental image” associated with the phenomenal given. For what 
are called real objects as well as mental images are themselves phenomena, 
already consisting of the two moments of given and meaning. Rather, mean­
ing is, if considered as such, marked by its “ideal” character. Suppose a series 
of phenomena such as this pine, that cedar, and so on, equally appear as one 
and the same meaning “tree.” Here, as we can see, unlike the pine or cedar 
located at a particular place, the meaning “tree” “exists anywhere”; in con­
trast to the individual trees, which grow, change, and finally die, the latter 
remains unchanged; and the meaning “tree” is “a universal that is not any of 
the individual phenomena, but can be any of them.” In this way, while givens 
are “individual, local, and variable” and may thus be called “real,” the mean­
ing exhibits a “universal, trans­spatial, and invariable,” in short, “ideal,” char­
acter.23 It should be noted, however, that this ideality of meaning holds only 
insofar as one attempts in thought to “isolate” the meaning from the whole 
phenomenon and to “treat it as if it were an independent term.” In other 
words, as Hiromatsu admits, his characterization of meaning as ideal con­
tains a kind of “reification,”24 and this critical and self­critical insight marks 
his decisive break with Husserlian phenomenology. In an effort to avoid this 
reification, Hiromatsu reformulates meaning as “functional,” in the sense of 
the mathematical function into which specific values—corresponding to 
phenomenal givens—are each time inserted.25 He holds this analogy to be 
appropriate insofar as the function is not considered in separation from the 
specific values it takes.
This motif of criticizing reification further leads Hiromatsu into a certain 
relativization of the given/meaning distinction itself. He points to the pos­
sibility of the “manifold process” or “multi­layered structure” in which “the 
given­cognized formation at one level… stands in the position of a given in 
relation to a higher­level meaningful cognized.”26 Conversely speaking, the 
23. hwc 15: 21; cf. 78f.
24. hwc 15: 17.
25. hwc 15: 22f., cf. 74f. It seems to me that, without compromising what Hiromatsu means 
here, meaning could well be likened to the mathematical variable rather than to the function. 
The analogy to the function is employed, however, in order to emphasize the relational character 
of meaning (private communication with Hiromatsu).
26. hwc 1: 45, 15: 7. The term “multi­layered structure” is cited from Hiromatsu 1988, 
which is not included in his Collected Works.
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phenomenal given at any level can be a twofold formation at a lower level. 
In the series of such different levels, he continues, “there is no fixed, unique 
lowest­level given.”27 For, as soon as one is aware of the phenomenal given 
as such, this can no longer be a pure given, but is already known as some­
thing. This being the case, “sensuous elements” in Mach’s philosophy as well 
as what positivists call “sense data” cannot be ultimate givens, but already 
assume the duality of given and meaning.
Thus far, while de­substantializing and relativizing the twofold structure 
of phenomena, Hiromatsu has restricted himself to their “known” side in a 
provisional abstraction from the subjective or “knowing” side. As he points 
out, however, a phenomenon is every time a phenomenon “for someone,”28 
and this someone—the “knower” (能知)—is, also like “the known” (所知), 
twofold in character. When, for instance, a child sees a cow, saying, “that’s 
a doggie,” it is indeed to the child, and not to me, that the phenomenon 
appears as a “doggie.” Nevertheless, Hiromatsu continues:
…without in a sense taking the cow as a doggie, I could not even know that 
the child has “mistaken” it for a dog. I can recognize the child’s mistake only 
insofar as I myself also in a sense take the cow as a doggie.29
Here we see the “self­dividing unity” of “oneself as oneself ” and “oneself 
as (playing the role of ) another.” While this is most manifestly seen in lin­
guistic communication, the duality of “someone as someone (else)” can be 
recognized generally in phenomenal consciousness. The latter someone, 
“initially a concrete individual,” tends, through human intercourse, to be 
depersonalized into “the one” (ヒト),30 so that the knower takes on the form 
of “someone as the one.” Insofar as the known is attributed to this someone 
as the one, Hiromatsu designates the someone as the “knowing someone” 
(能知的誰某) and the one as the “cognizing Someone” (能識的或者), for­
27. hwc 15: 8.
28. hwc 1: 38/973. The second page number refers to the English translation (Hiromatsu 
2011).
29. hwc 1: 39/974 (translation modified).
30. hwc 15: 133f. In Hiromatsu’s account, what he means by “the one” more or less overlaps 
with Martin Heidegger’s concept of “das Man” (hwc 1: 44/977). As the English translator 
Viren Murthy comments, however, the one is “free of some of the pejorative connotations” of 
das Man (Hiromatsu 2011, 973).
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mulating the duality of the knower: P as [P].31 He characterizes the cogniz­
ing Someone in a manner similar to the meaningful cognized seen above: 
While the knowing someone may be called “individual, variable, and local,” 
that is, “real,” the cognizing Someone, if considered as such, exhibits a “uni­
versal, invariable, and trans­spatial,” in short, “ideal” character.32 Thus struc­
tured in parallel with the known, the knower “exists as a cognizing Someone 
who is more than a knowing someone.”33
It might appear to the reader that Hiromatsu is simply calling the sub­
ject and the object by other names—knower and known, respectively—
and dividing each of them into two factors. Yet, as he emphasizes, unlike 
the traditional notions of subject and object, knower and known are not 
“ontically separate,” but are, as is illustrated by “the expansion and contrac­
tion of the bodily self,” just the two non­fixed aspects of a “state of union.”34 
This internal link between knower and known is further specified as fol­
lows. First, the phenomenal given and the knowing some one are necessarily 
connected in such a way that the former is “each time perspectivally given” 
to the latter.35 Second, and more importantly, the formation of a meaning is 
correlative with the process through which different knowers make them­
selves intersubjectively isomorphic to become a cognizing Someone. Not 
only the meanings of linguistic signs, but also the perceptual articulations 
of phenomena are already conditioned by the “intersubjective cultural set­
ting”—as is illustrated by the fact that the dog’s bark, which native Japanese 
speakers hear as wanwan, sounds like “bow­wow” to native English speak­
ers.36 In this way, “intersubjectivity” (間主観性 or 共同主観性) serves as the 
31. hwc 15: 148. Just as in the case of 所知 and 所識, one can hardly distinguish between the 
intrinsic meanings of 能知的 (knowing) and 能識的 (cognizing)—Hiromatsu’s neologisms—
or between 誰某 (someone) and 或者 (Someone). The philosophically relevant distinctions rest 
entirely on his original usage of the terms.
32. hwc 15: 135.
33. hwc 15: 132.
34. hwc 15: 92, 98, 96. As examples of the expansion of the bodily self, Hiromatsu cites 
“the blind person’s cane and the medical doctor’s stethoscope” as well as the “observational 
instrument” in physics, which is given special importance in the context of quantum theory. 
On the other hand, he takes a “paralyzed arm or leg” as an example of the contraction of the 
bodily self (hwc 15: 91–3).
35. hwc 15: 185.
36. Hiromatsu 1988, 90f.
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essential link between meaning and Someone.37 Intersubjectivity lies in the 
fact that “while I and others have as givens different perspectival phenom­
ena,” we can share one and the same meaning.38 
As is suggested by our consideration so far, the twofold structures of 
both knower and known are combined to form what Hiromatsu calls the 
fourfold structure (四肢構造) of the phenomenon: “a given presents itself as 
something to someone as Someone,” or, in fully technical terms, “a phenom­
enal given is valid as a meaningful cognized to a knowing someone as a cog­
nizing Someone” (p as [p] for P as [P]).39 For instance, something outside 
the window appears as a pine tree to me as a “one” (general knower); and the 
sound “tree” bears the meaning of tree for someone as an English speaker. As 
Hiromatsu repeatedly stresses, the above four moments of the phenomenon 
are not self­contained elements that subsequently enter into relation to one 
another, but themselves “subsist only as terms of the [fourfold] functional 
relationship.”40 Furthermore, a fourfold­structured phenomenon itself is 
“not closed in on itself as a four­term relation,” but exists only in relation 
to other phenomena, that is, to other fourfold formations.41 Insofar as the 
phenomenon is thus relationally structured, Hiromatsu names it the koto 
(事)—a Japanese term that defies simple translation, but may roughly be 
rendered as “state of affairs” or Sachverhalt.42 Hiromatsu counterposes this 
koto to the mono (物), namely, the thing (Ding, res) that is taken as substan­
tial and self­contained. 
In terms of this contrast between koto and mono, Hiromatsu defines the 
term “reification” (物象化), broadening Karl Marx’s concept of reification 
(Versachlichung)—the reification of the social relation between humans—
into a concept that covers the whole phenomenal world. By reification he 
means mistaking a koto for a mono, that is, a misconception of the fourfold 
37. Hiromatsu uses the two Japanese terms 間主観性 and 共同主観性 as translations of 
“intersubjectivity” with their nuances somewhat different from each other, but without an 
explicit conceptual distinction between them. I will discuss issues concerning these terms 
toward the end of the third section.
38. hwc 15: 189.
39. hwc 15: 198.
40. hwc 1: 45.
41. hwc 13: 260.
42. hwc 15: 199.
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structural relation such that one or more terms of the relation are taken as 
independent of other terms or of the whole relationship.43 More strictly, 
in terms of the quasi­Hegelian we/it perspectival difference, reification is 
defined as the circumstance that “a koto, which is determined relationally 
from the point of view of scholarly reflection (für uns), appears as a mono to 
the immediate consciousness involved (für es).”44 While the hypostatization 
of meaning represents the most typical mode of reification, Hiromatsu is no 
less critical of the Machian or other modes of reification of the phenomenal 
given, or of the reification of the known or the knower as a whole. A con­
tinual uncovering and overcoming of reification in this manner constitutes 
the leading motif of his philosophical enterprise.
It should be noted, however, that this idea of reification in its relation 
to the fourfold structure is formulated within the framework of static or 
synchronic structural analysis. Yet, as we will see below, Hiromatsu’s philos­
ophy does not entirely confine itself to, but at least partly goes beyond, the 
synchronic frame of analysis, and, moreover, his formulation of synchronic 
structure itself depends in part on motifs exceeding the synchronic dimen­
sion. This being the case, there may also arise circumstances in which the 
concept of reification as defined above synchronically can no longer be 
maintained as it is. In the next section, I will pursue such more or less latent 
lines of thought of Hiromatsu, with a focus on the way in which phenom­
ena are dynamically structured and thereby displaced in meaning.
43. According to Hiromatsu, not only individualism or atomism, which “substantializes 
terms of a relation,” but also holism, which “substantializes the totality of a relation,” is a 
“reifying misconception” (hwc 16: 282). The primary target of his critique, however, is the 
individualist and elementalist type of reification, because this type is characteristic of the 
modern worldview (see hwc 10: 496).
44. hwc 13: 245. As Hiromatsu notes, the “we” in his—as well as Marx’s—sense differs from 
the Hegelian we (wir) in that it does not stand in the position of absolute knowledge, but is 
relative to the specific stage of the dialogical­dialectical processes in which it is formed (hwc 
4: 425; cf. 2: 357).
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 Displacement and reification  
in the structuring of the known
In his 1979 book Things, States of Affairs, Words『もの・こと・こ
とば』, when discussing the fourfold structure of linguistic phenomena, 
Hiromatsu adds the following note to the text:
While in this work I have studied [linguistic phenomena] provisionally as 
they are reified in the mode of the langue, it is necessary to note in a more 
rigorous discussion that the linguistic formation is “produced” (reproduced) 
each time it is spoken and understood in hearing, and that this is also the 
case with “meaning.” In reality, the identity and invariability of meaning 
hold, as it were, only on a meta­level, that is, only insofar as the intentional 
moment that each time occurs “productively” is identified reflectively from 
our point of view (für uns).45
Does reification here also mean the hypostatization of the meaning or any 
other term of the fourfold structure? It can hardly be so, because Hiromatsu’s 
main text to which the above note refers is devoted entirely to a critique of 
reification in this sense. Rather, it seems that the term “reified” in the above 
quotation is concerned with the structure in which an identical meaning is 
maintained over a series of phenomena, that is, with the synchronic given/
meaning structure itself. Correlatively, the critique of this reification is being 
made from a point of view that surpasses the synchronic framework.
The possibility of such a shift in the meaning of reification will be still 
more difficult to ignore if we look—here briefly—at Hiromatsu’s analysis of 
the practical world. First, Hiromatsu characterizes as “reified” the circum­
stance that the rules and norms of action appear as rigid and self­identical 
“despite their plasticity.”46 Second, maintaining generally that human action 
is carried out “as something more than a mere bodily behavior,” namely, as 
45. hwc 1: 445 (first emphasis mine). Elsewhere, in discussing the practical dimension, 
Hiromatsu makes a parallel remark: The “norms and rules” of action are “produced and 
reproduced each time the subjects involved act in a specific manner” (hwc 16: 416).
46. hwc 16: 450. As regards historical laws, Hiromatsu maintains that “it is through a 
reification of the activity of individuals that historical­social lawfulness holds” (hwc 10: 175f.). 
In his analysis of the cognitive world, however, he characterizes as reifying, not so much law or 
lawfulness itself, but rather the notion that laws “govern” individual facts (hwc 15: 485). This 
seems to illustrate the fact that Hiromatsu’s dynamic conceptions come to the fore more visibly 
in the practical than in the cognitive dimension.
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an interhuman “role­playing,” he points out that roles (役割) tend to be 
“reified” into fixed “Roles” (役柄) such as statuses and positions.47 In this 
“institutional reification of the connection of role actions,” he continues, 
individual actors become “impersonal and anonymous.”48 These points seem 
to raise questions for the cognitive dimension as well, insofar as we are to 
avoid inconsistency between the cognitive and the practical: If a self­iden­
tical meaning and, correlatively, a depersonalized “one” or cognizing Some­
one are established, is not this circumstance already reified? If this is so, is 
not the fourfold structure itself, as understood in the synchronic frame­
work, already a product of reification?
Before directly examining these questions, I wish to qualify the par­
allels that I earlier drew between Hiromatsu’s and Saussure’s relationist 
views. First, Hiromatsu’s concept of the signifier is not, as the Saussurean 
signifier (signifiant), a formal factor within the already structured langue, 
but the “material moment” each time phenomenally given.49 This concep­
tion of the signifier makes it possible to inquire into processes prior to the 
establishment of a langue­like structure. As a concrete inquiry along this 
line, Hiromatsu enters into the process in which perceptual phenomena are 
progressively articulated. In his account, this process consists of the follow­
ing series of stages: (a) Something is congealed from the “nothing­ground” 
(無－地) to become a “figure”; (b) the figure and the ground are differenti­
ated so that the former appears as self­identical; and (c) two such figures 
become distinct from each other in the mode of “this and that.”50 While, 
in the first stage (a), there is already a potential duality in which something 
appears as a figure, it is not until stage (b) that this figure is grasped as a 
meaning through the mediation of the reflexive relation to the ground.51 
Conversely speaking, Hiromatsu’s theory includes within its scope the cir­
47. hwc 1: 113, 16: 99, 5: 139. In his later work, Hiromatsu introduced a distinction between 
役割 and 役柄, both of which are commonly translated as “role.” While by 役割 he means “role” 
in general, he reserves 役柄 for the role that is already fixed as status or position. In this study, I 
render 役割 and 役柄 as “role” and “Role,” respectively.
48. hwc 5: 220, 228.
49. hwc 15: 168.
50. hwc 15: 151ff.
51. hwc 1: 347f.
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cumstance that “something other than the given” is not yet established as the 
self­identical meaningful cognized.
These points suggest that Hiromatsu’s philosophy, while primarily a 
synchronic structural analysis, diverges from Saussure’s position (at least in 
his Course in General Linguistics)52 and structuralism, and opens itself to the 
dimension of “structural change”—in a broad sense of the term covering 
“the formation, maintenance, and transformation of structure.”53 Notwith­
standing Hiromatsu’s remark that “my developmental arguments are largely 
an auxiliary means for a theory of being­structure,”54 the developmental, 
or better, the dynamic dimension seems to be an indispensable moment of 
his thought. This dynamic dimension is concerned not so much with the 
merely diachronic transition of already structured systems, but rather with 
the very process through which phenomena are structured.55 It is no doubt 
in terms of this structuring movement—in the sense including both de­ and 
re­structuring—that we can adequately understand what Hiromatsu calls 
reification “in the mode of the langue” or “institutional reification.” In what 
follows, I will accordingly explore this dimension of structuring with a pro­
visional restriction to the known side of phenomena.
Some important clues for understanding Hiromatsu’s dynamic concep­
tions may be found in some apparently minor details of his texts. First, there 
seems to be an ambiguity when he characterizes meaning as either “some­
thing more” or “something other” than the phenomenal given. Yet, well 
aware of this apparent ambiguity, Hiromatsu seeks to remove it by noting 
that, strictly speaking, a meaning can be said to be “something more” not 
relatively to the phenomenal given itself, but only to another, lower­level 
meaning in a multi­layered structure. In relation to the phenomenal given 
on the same level, he continues, the meaning may only be called something 
52. Here I leave on one side the question of whether and to what extent Saussure’s Course 
in General Linguistics, posthumously compiled and published, represents his original thought. 
For a thematic study of this and related questions about Saussure’s thought, see Maruyama 
1981.
53. hwc 14: 199.
54. hwc 15: 36.
55. Hiromatsu remarks, for example, that the fourfold structure “consists solely in the process 
relationship” (hwc 1: 43f., my emphasis) among the moments of phenomena, notably between 
meaning and cognizing Someone in their correlative formation.
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else. In this sense, it is not more­or­lessness, but “otherness” that is basic to 
the relation between given and meaning.56
Second, however, there remains another ambiguity, not mentioned as 
such by Hiromatsu himself, in his formulation of the duality of phenom­
ena. On the one hand, as we have seen, Hiromatsu claims that a phenom­
enon appears as something “more than a mere ‘sensuous’ given,” or more 
precisely, something other than the phenomenal given. This type of formu­
lation readily leads to the synchronic structure in which the phenomenon 
comprises the two moments of given and meaning. On the other hand, he 
also maintains that the phenomenon is such that, “in showing itself…, it 
always already shows something else.”57 This mode of expression implies 
that p appears as something other than p itself, or, in other words, that the 
phenomenon contains in itself a movement of becoming other than itself 
or a displacement of itself. It is no doubt this latter formulation that is rel­
evant to the dynamic dimension, which is rendered invisible in the first 
formulation.
To make a third point, I wish to start by specifying what Hiromatsu 
means by the phrase “in itself ” (即自的 an sich) as in the statement that 
“a phenomenon… appears in itself as something more than a mere ‘sensu­
ous’ given.” By this qualification “in itself,” he means that the knower is 
not always actually—but in many cases only potentially—conscious of 
the twofoldness of phenomena. According to Hiromatsu, “in the immedi-
ate consciousness of the subject involved,” the phenomenon is commonly 
a full unity of given and meaning. In reflective consciousness, however, it is 
readily “bifurcated” into the two moments.58 This indicates that, despite his 
preliminary characterization of the phenomenal world as “the world as it 
appears to pre­reflective consciousness,”59 one cannot maintain the twofold 
structure without including reflection on phenomena in the phenomenal 
world itself.
56. hwc 1: 349.
57. Hiromatsu also says that consciousness “does not receive the given as such, but is aware of 
it as something other or something more than the given” (hwc 1: 34).
58. hwc 1: 348.
59. Hiromatsu acknowledges the “fictional” character of such a pre­reflective world, noting 
that it is “nothing more than our basic prejudgment” relative to our historical and social 
conditions (hwc 1: 31, 15: 32).
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What is more important, however, is Hiromatsu’s argument directly fol­
lowing the above: As soon as one is thus aware of the phenomenal given in 
distinction to the meaning, this given is no longer a given as such, but is 
itself dualized into a given and a meaning.
For instance, when one is aware of a “comma” [in a written text] and then 
tries to make explicit “the given” of which one has just been aware as a 
comma, one is now aware of that moment as, say, a black spot. That is, one is 
aware of the given anew in a twofold structure, as a cognized “black spot,” 
which differs from the initially cognized “comma.”60
This passage from Hiromatsu’s Things, States of Affairs, Words is meant to 
prove the non­presence of the phenomenal given “purified” from meaning, 
which is an important point of his synchronic analysis as seen earlier. In my 
view, however, what is more relevant here lies in the course of the argument 
itself: Reflective consciousness not only makes explicit the twofoldness of 
the phenomenon (p as [p]), but also produces a new twofold formation (p′ 
as [p′]), that is, dualizes the phenomenon differently than earlier.61 Reflec­
tion on a phenomenon, itself involved in the phenomenal world, cannot 
simply be to view the phenomenon just as it is, but necessarily redetermines 
it in meaning. That is to say, a phenomenon, as soon as it is reflected upon, 
undergoes a displacement in meaning.
While this point has been made about reflection on the phenomenal 
given, the same point will basically apply to reflection on the meaning or 
the given/meaning as a whole. A series of such reflections leads to what 
Hiromatsu calls the “manifold process,” mentioned earlier, which may 
be expressed as “p as [p] as [[p]]….” Here the as­connection “…as [[p]],” 
for example, may provisionally be called an addition to the preceding as­
connection “p as [p].” Yet, despite the architectonic image easily evoked by 
Hiromatsu’s expressions such as “multilayered structure” or “piling­up,”62 the 
60. hwc 1: 348. In this quotation, I have translated 所知 as the cognized, not as the known, 
because by 所知 Hiromatsu here means what he would call 所識 in his later work.
61. In Being and Meaning, Hiromatsu makes a similar point using the example of Rubin’s 
figure. In his account, one may at first say that the black­and­white figure is seen either as a vase 
or as two facing profiles (hwc 15: 5). As soon as this black­and­white figure is perceived as such, 
however, it becomes “yet another meaningful cognized beside the two profiles and vase” (hwc 
15: 7).
62. hwc 1: 349.
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addition of a new dual connection, which is a reflection on the preceding 
dual formation, cannot leave the latter purely intact. Insofar as any reflection 
on phenomena is itself involved in the connection of phenomena, and the 
meaning of any phenomenon is determined in relation to other phenom­
ena, it follows that the manifold process is also a process of displacement in 
meaning.
So far we have traced some of Hiromatsu’s lines of thought that tend to 
surpass his synchronic framework, which suggest that phenomena, includ­
ing reflections on phenomena, contain in themselves a movement of dis­
placement or self­displacement in meaning.63 Taking now one step further 
than his own accounts, let us examine whether and, if so, how such a dis­
placement occurs in the process through which there arises a meaning 
common to different phenomenal givens. While meaning is a constitutive 
moment of a single phenomenon, its existence rather lies in the possibility64 
that it is reproduced as one and the same meaning over a (potentially indefi­
nite) number of phenomena. This identical meaning, in Hiromatsu’s view, 
does not exist independently of the phenomena, nor can it be derived from 
them through “inductive abstraction.” Rather it derives from a “direct equat­
ing” of the phenomena with each other in terms of meaning.65 This equating 
may be illustrated by such cases as recognizing the person just seen as an 
old friend, or regarding this pine and that cedar as similar things. Although 
the identical meaning (“tree” in the latter example), once established, seems 
to precede individual phenomena, let us start from the situation in which 
it does not yet exist, and examine how it emerges through the equating of 
phenomena.
Hiromatsu thematizes this kind of equating not so much in his major 
epistemological­ontological works as in his writings on Marx’s thought, 
63. In his analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu briefly speaks of “displacement” (ズレ) as 
it occurs in the imitation of actions (hwc 16: 444). 
64. The word “possibility” is needed here to reflect Hiromatsu’s view that meaning, while 
it must be reproducible, need not be actually reproduced over different phenomena (see hwc 
4: 78). Incidentally, we can see a parallel between this idea and Jacques Derrida’s notion of 
“iterability” (Derrida 1972a, 375/315).
65. hwc 15: 158. This applies to phenomena in the third stage of the process of articulation as 
seen earlier, that is, a pair of phenomena that become distinct from each other in the mode of 
“this and that.”
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specifically in his 1974 book The Philosophy of Capital『資本論の哲学』. In 
it he analyzes Marx’s theory of the commodity with a focus on the equat­
ing (Gleichsetzung) of different commodities in their exchange. Although 
Marx’s discussion of “the two factors of commodities” and “the duality of 
labor,” which correspond to the Hiromatsuan dualities of phenomena in the 
known and the knowing sides, respectively, already prefigures the outline of 
the fourfold structure, Hiromatsu’s reading centers on Marx’s subsequent 
analysis of the value­form, an analysis of the very process through which 
such a structure is formed.66 Given the structural parallelism in Hiromatsu’s 
philosophy between the cognitive and the practical dimensions, the prob­
lematic of the equating of commodities in value may reasonably be carried 
over into the equating of phenomena in cognitive meaning.
Let us first consider two phenomena p1 and p2, say, this pine and that 
cedar, and suppose that p2 is equated with p1 in meaning. Although this 
equating does not, as with that of commodities, have a quantitative char­
acter, I express it likewise by the equation p1 = p2. Following Marx, by this 
equation I mean the unidirectional relation in which p1 is worth p2, and 
not the other way around. By analogy with Marx’s terminology, we can say 
that p1 is determined in meaning relatively to p2 and thus stands in the “rela­
tive form of meaning,” whereas p2 serves as the measure or “meaning mir­
ror” of this determination (similar to what Marx calls the “value mirror”) 
and is thus in the “equivalent form.”67 In this equating, p1 assumes duality 
(p1 as [p1]) through the mediation of its reflexive relation to p2. While, like 
any other phenomenon, p1 is, prior to the above specific equating, already a 
dual formation of given/meaning, it is newly dualized through this equat­
ing, taking on a meaning other than the previous one (“pine”).68 That is, the 
66. See mega ii­6: 80ff./138ff. It should be noted, however, that Hiromatsu considers the 
simple form of value to be already a “constitutive moment” of the total or expanded form of 
value (hwc 12: 399), and does not treat the transition from the former to the latter—and further 
to the general form of value—as a dynamic process of structuring. I have elsewhere critically 
examined this aspect of Hiromatsu’s reading of Marx (Katsumori 2016b). My analysis here, 
starting from the equating of two phenomena, will treat the subsequent process as a literally 
dynamic development.
67. See Marx’s argument in mega ii­6: 81/139f., 85/144.
68. As we can see, this process constitutes part of a manifold process as discussed earlier. The 
previous meaning “pine” was also formed through equating of phenomena, and, in this sense, 
the series of equating processes has no unambiguous origin. It is also worth noting that when 
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meaning of p1 is determined in terms of p2, as something equal in meaning to 
p2. This state of affairs, a dualization through equating, may be expressed as:
 p1 as [p1 (=p2)].
69 (1)
Next, let us suppose that a third phenomenon p3, say, that oak, appears and 
is also equated with p1 (p1 = p3). Then p1 is again, but differently, dualized, 
where both p2 and p3 serve as p1’s equivalents:
 p1 as [p1 (=p2, p3)]. (2)
The transition from (1) to (2) indicates that the equating of p2, p3, and in 
general, pn, with p1 each time newly dualizes p1 and redetermines it in mean­
ing. This applies not only to p1, but mutatis mutandis also to p2, p3, and other 
phenomena. It thus follows that each newly added equation “= pn” rede­
termines all the phenomena with which it is equated, thereby incessantly 
rearticulating the phenomenal world. In other words, the equating of dif­
ferent phenomena, constitutive of an identical meaning, cannot be a pure 
reproduction of the same meaning, but contains a movement that each time 
displaces the phenomena in meaning.70 
To be sure, it has been pointed out by many that the repetitive repro­
duction of meaning brings about its displacement or fluctuation. What is 
important here, however, is that the displacement of meaning, or the dis­
placement of phenomena in meaning, is not simply due to a change in the 
context external to the phenomena, but that, as analyzed above, it arises 
structurally and unavoidably from the very constitution of the same mean­
ing.71 It should be noted that this displacement of meaning is not gener­
p2 is equated with p1, p1 may perceptually have disappeared and be reproduced in memory. In 
this case, p2 is equated not directly with the “original”’ p1, but with a reproductive remembrance 
thereof.
69. As mentioned in the first section, Hiromatsu holds that any identification of a meaning, 
say [p], is already mediated by its difference from other meanings, [q], [r], …. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, this reflexive determination is not explicitly dealt with here.
70. As we can see, this point is again reminiscent of Derrida’s conception of “iterability.” 
According to Derrida, while the possibility of repetition or iteration is constitutive of the ideal 
identity of meaning, this iteration “always alters… that which it seems to reproduce” (Derrida 
1990, 82/40). In my view, however, Derrida does not fully explicate why or how this “alteration” 
occurs, and thus his arguments may be supplemented by an inquiry comparable to the analysis 
attempted here with respect to Hiromatsu’s philosophy.
71. This is related to Hiromatsu’s (rather unelaborated) point that “in the mechanism 
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ally noticed by the consciousness directly engaged in the acts of equating. 
It can first be recognized as such by a reflective consciousness that directs 
attention to such a transition as that from (1) to (2). Since, however, as we 
saw above, reflection on phenomena and their meanings generally displaces 
what is reflected upon, reflection on a displacement of meaning gives rise 
to yet another displacement. From this it follows that the displacement of 
meaning cannot be unambiguously determined. This is analogous to the cir­
cumstance in quantum theory, as it is analyzed by Niels Bohr, that the inter­
action between objects and measuring instruments “cannot be controlled,” 
because any attempt to determine such an interaction in its turn introduces 
“new possibilities of interaction.”72 We can thus borrow Bohr’s terminology 
to characterize the displacement of meaning as in principle “uncontrollable.”
Under certain prevalent, if not ubiquitous, circumstances, however, this 
uncontrollable displacement seems on the surface to disappear. Suppose 
that, from the series of phenomena, one picks out a specific phenomenon p*, 
and gives priority to the equations having p* on the right side, namely p1 = 
p*, p2 = p*, …, and thus to the as­connections having p* as the sole equivalent 
(or meaning mirror), “p1 as [p1 (=p*)],” “p2 as [p2 (=p*)],” and so on. In this 
case, p* comes to serve as a sign in the narrow sense (e.g. the word “tree”) that 
exclusively represents all the other phenomena in question, thus structurally 
stabilizing the connection of phenomena.73 Here p* may be designated as 
the general signifier, and the meaning common to all the phenomena as the 
general signified.74 Denoting this general signified by [p*], we can express 
the structure thus stabilized as:
of reproductive maintenance of structures lies also the possibility of structural change” 
(Maruyama and Hiromatsu 1993, 204).
72. Bohr 1987, 2: 40f. According to Bohr, this uncontrollability of interaction leads to 
the relation of “complementarity” between “the space­time co­ordination and the claim of 
causality” (Bohr 1987, 1: 54f.). Further, he extends this view beyond physics to the cognitive 
process in general, pointing to the complementarity of “the analysis of a concept and its 
immediate application” (Bohr 1987, 1: 20). This enlarged conception of complementarity 
seems to be essentially linked to the thematic developed here in the text. For a philosophical­
historical analysis of Bohr’s complementarity, see Katsumori 2011.
73. In his analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu speaks of the “structural stabilization” of 
the relation of cooperative actions between different persons (hwc 5: 248).
74. These terms—general signifier and signified—appear, under the reified condition in the 
sense to be defined below, as what Derrida calls “transcendental signifier” and “transcendental 
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 p1, p2, … as [p*]. (3)
Again with reference to Marx’s analysis of the value­form, this structure 
is analogous to the general form of value or the money form, where p* cor­
responds to the “general equivalent” or money, and [p*] to the value of com­
modities as commensurated by the general equivalent.75 Since, from the 
Hiromatsuan point of view, sign p* is in principle nothing more than one 
phenomenon among others, its introduction does not alter the basic fact 
that the equating of phenomena displaces them in meaning. Moreover, priv­
ileging the relations with p* as the equivalent is itself a further displacement 
of the connection of phenomena. Nevertheless, these displacements tend 
to be concealed as a result of the above structural stabilization. For, under 
formula (3), it seems as if the meanings of phenomena p1, p2, … were deter­
mined in terms of p* alone, thus fixed once and for all, without being inces­
santly redetermined. This leads to the notion that the series of phenomena 
shares the purely self­identical and directly present meaning [p*]. Further­
more, once the structure (3) is set up for phenomena p1, p2, …, pn, a further 
equating of pn+1 with these phenomena seems to be confined to the same 
structure despite the fact that this equating again displaces the phenomena 
in meaning.76 For example, although calling something a tree (instead of a 
grass or anything else) each time redetermines “tree” in meaning, it seems 
as if the meaning of “tree” were fixed in advance. Thus the displacing move­
ment of phenomena apparently gives way to the synchronic structure of 
given/meaning. In my view, it is precisely this kind of concealment of the 
dynamic dimension that Hiromatsu means by reification “in the mode of 
the langue” or “institutional reification.” This reification no longer primar­
ily refers to a substantializing misconception of what is in synchronic rela­
tionship. The concept of reification may rather be redefined as the apparent 
reduction of displacing movement to a synchronic structure.
From this perspective, let us reexamine Hiromatsu’s analogy of meaning 
or the meaningful cognized with the mathematical function. Hiromatsu 
signified,” respectively (Derrida 1967, 33/20; 1972b, 120/86).
75. See mega ii­6: 96–101/157–62.
76. As Hiromatsu notes, although the linguistically expressed meaning is “in an incessant 
process of formation and change,” it tends to become apparently fixed and ready­made (hwc 
15: 179). 
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indeed stresses that, in this analogy, what really exists is solely the function 
f (x, y, z, …) with specific values inserted into its variables x, y, z, …, and not 
the function itself as it is independent of inserted values. Yet our consid­
eration above indicates a further point he does not make explicit. That is, 
the equating of different phenomena corresponds to the substitution of spe­
cific values, not into an already existing function, but rather for other specific 
values.77 It is a series of such substitutions that first generates a “function,” 
while at the same time altering and displacing it. In contrast, the mathemati­
cal function, while not independent of the whole set of insertable values, is 
in general considered as remaining purely the same regardless of the specific 
values inserted each time, insofar as these values are within the range for 
which the function is defined in advance. To this extent, contrary to Hiro­
matsu’s remarks, “functional identity” can by no means be contrasted with 
“rigid self­identity.”78 Put differently, the validity (Gültigkeit) of a function 
implies its indifference (Gleichgültigkeit) to specific values. In fact, in his 
analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu himself introduces the concept 
of the function to characterize the circumstance that the personality of indi­
viduals becomes “irrelevant (gleichgültig)” to their relation of roles.79 This 
enables us to see how meaning differs in character from the mathematical 
function as it is commonly understood. It is by virtue of this difference that 
the “structural form” of phenomena, a specific kind of meaning, is subject to 
change.80 This being the case, the analogy of meaning to the mathematical 
function, insofar as the latter is understood in the above manner, proves to 
be already reifying—reifying in the sense redefined above. In other words, 
reification, as it is dynamically reconceived, refers precisely to the circum­
stance that different phenomena p1, p2, … seems to be functionally subsumed 
under a general signified [p*]. In fact, this reification seems to be most 
77. This is related to Hiromatsu’s point in his analysis of the cognitive world that learning 
rules as objective knowledge is preceded by “imitation” of actions (hwc 16: 442; cf. 430).
78. hwc 15: 26.
79. hwc 1: 118.
80. hwc 14: 220. Hiromatsu remarks that meaning, while remaining self­identical “within 
certain limits,” “can be experienced as something else… if it changes beyond [these] limits” 
(hwc 1: 350). It should be noted, however, that these limits are not, as in the case of the 
mathematical function, determined in advance.
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strongly prompted in physical­scientific knowledge, which seeks to deter­
mine phenomena by subsuming them under mathematical functions.
In the present section, I have striven to extend some of Hiromatsu’s con­
ceptual motifs to show how his theory of the fourfold structure tends to 
move beyond itself. Focusing particularly on the displacement of phenom­
ena in meaning and the reifying mechanism of its concealment, my analysis 
has also suggested that the functional relation, which, in his account, essen­
tially characterizes “phenomena as they really are,”81 is itself reified in char­
acter. The scope of this section, however, has still been limited to the known 
side of phenomena. Given the structural link between knower and known, 
we must explicitly take into account the knowing side, and thus the inter­
subjective dimension, of phenomena. In the next section, I will accordingly 
examine the fourfold structuring of phenomena in the mutual understand­
ing of knowers.
Displacement and Reification  
in the fourfold­structuring of phenomena
Hiromatsu more or less implicitly supposes circumstances in 
which a meaning common to various phenomena, or a general signified, is 
not established, nor a cognizing Someone correlative with such a meaning. 
In fact, with regard to the knowing side of phenomena—as we have seen in 
the example of noticing the child’s “mistake” of calling a cow a doggie—he 
starts from the twofoldness of “someone as someone (else)” where not only 
the former someone, but also the latter is a “concrete individual.”82 Further­
more, as suggested by his remarks that the duality of knowing someone and 
cognizing Someone holds “except for the latent ‘knowing subject’ in the 
developmentally initial phase,” and that some kinds of mental illness may 
be characterized as a “disintegration” of the cognizing Someone, Hiromatsu 
seems to hold that there are phases or cases in which the cognizing Someone 
81. hwc 15: 18.
82. Here it is not essential, however, to take the individual as the starting point, considering 
that, in Hiromatsu’s view, the personal individual is not a primary being, but derives from the 
division of pre­personal phenomena into self and other (hwc 15: 112).
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is either not yet established or has already collapsed.83 He does not, however, 
fully analyze the formation or dissolution of the cognizing Someone, that is, 
the structuring process of the knower, or the process of intersubjective four­
fold structuring, as distinct from the synchronic structure. In this section, 
starting from, but going one step beyond, Hiromatsu’s ideas, I will accord­
ingly investigate the dimension of fourfold structuring and thereby amplify 
my previous discussion of displacement and reification.
In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, I provisionally limit myself to 
the relation between two knowers and focus on their mutual understand­
ing through linguistic communication.84 Suppose an English and a Japanese 
speaker, P1 and P2, both of whom initially have no knowledge of each other’s 
language, utter words p1 and p2—say “tree” and “ki”—respectively, and let 
us consider the process through which they come to grasp these words as 
having the same meaning.85 If, to begin with, P1 thinks that P2’s word “ki” 
means “tree,” he equates in meaning his own word p1 with the word he has 
just heard, p2, or, to put it differently, grasps p2 as equal in meaning to p1 (p2 
= p1). That is to say, P1 dualizes p2 into
 p2 as [p2 (= p1)]. (4)
In a conjugate manner, the Japanese speaker P2 thinks that P1’s word “tree” 
means “ki,” that is, equates p2 with p1 (p1 = p2) and thereby dualizes p1 into
 p1 as [p1 (= p2)]. (5)
It is important to note that, for the same reason as given in the previous sec­
tion, these dualizations of phenomena are re­dualizations such that each of 
the phenomena in question are already displaced in meaning. Even though 
p2 was, for P1, initially nothing more than a sound lacking a specific lin­
guistic meaning, it was already a phenomenon laden with meaning in the 
Hiromatsuan broad sense of the term. This p2 or “ki” is, through the equat­
83. hwc 15: 148, 2: 453.
84. Hiromatsu is critical of the approach that treats language games or speech acts as “the 
general model of social action” (hwc 16: 341), and I also do not intend to make the following 
example in the text a paradigm of the intersubjective structuring of phenomena.
85. If, in this example, a tree or ki is perceptually given as in the earlier case of “cow/dog,” 
it may be necessary to enter into the relation between such perceptual phenomena and the 
linguistic signs “tree” and “ ki” (which are themselves phenomena). To avoid intricacies, how­
ever, here we abstract from such reference to perceptual phenomena.
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ing relation p2 = p1, redetermined in meaning as something equal to “tree.” 
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to p1.
The relation p2 = p1 and its converse p1 = p2 are different equating relations, 
and therefore the as­connections (4) and (5), which involve these relations, 
also differ from each other. That is, in (4), p2 is determined in meaning—
with p1 as equivalent (or meaning mirror)—from P1’s standpoint, while (5) 
represents a reverse determination of meaning from P2’s standpoint. Insofar 
as the two knowers’ points of view cannot be arbitrarily interchanged, (4) 
and (5) constitute two distinct connections of phenomena that are formally 
symmetrical and yet mutually exclusive. This being the case, at the present 
stage, we do not yet have the structure in which P1 and P2 jointly, as cogniz­
ing Someone, grasp p1 and p2 as the same meaningful cognized or, in other 
words, as a general signified—general in the still limited sense of being com­
mon to the two knowers and to the two known phenomena.
The formation of this kind of structure, that is, the fourfold structural 
stabilization of the connection of phenomena, is commonly mediated by 
the introduction of a general signifier as a correlative of the general signi­
fied, and takes on various forms depending on the way the general signifier is 
introduced. Here I will consider the following three types of cases:
(a)  Either p1 or p2 is privileged over the other and becomes the gen­
eral signifier;
(b)  A third phenomenon is introduced and privileged over p1 and 
p2, thereby serving as the general signifier;
(c)  A relation of transformation between p1 and p2 is set up in a man­
ner differently from (a) and (b), and the signifying side of this 
relation itself serves as the general signifier.
Let us start by examining case (a), which seems to conform the most to 
substantialist ontology.
(a) In the above example, this corresponds to the case in which one of 
the two knowers, say P1, privileges his own language and imposes it on the 
other, P2, who comes to submit to this one­sided move by P1. In this case, 
P2 accepts P1’s point of view, and—if we apply Hiromatsu’s term “role” (役
割) to the cognitive dimension as well—takes his knowing role as her own, 
coming to think herself that her word “ki” means “tree.” Here the equat­
ing relation p1 = p2, which was initially set up by P2, becomes repressed or 
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excluded. In other words, phenomenon p2, which served as p1’s equivalent as 
well, turns into a term merely determined in meaning, while the relation p2 
= p1 are privileged over p1 = p2 and thus relation (4) over (5). Through this 
process, p1, or the word “tree,”becomes the general signifier that unilaterally 
represents p2, and a meaning common to both phenomena, a general signi­
fied [p1], is established. In this way, the set of relations (4) and (5) reduce to 
the single relation
 p1, p2 as [p1]. (6)
Correlatively, both knowers come to play P1’s knowing role as the Role (役
柄) of a cognizing Someone, [P1]—let us call it the cognizing Role—and 
thus the connection of phenomena is stabilized in a fourfold structure (p1, 
p2 as [p1] for P1, P2 as [P1]). Speaking again by analogy with Marx’s account 
of the value­form, we can see not only that—similarly to the case (3) in Sec­
tion 2—p1 corresponds to the general equivalent or money and [p1] to the 
value as commensurated by money, but also that [P1] corresponds to the 
subject of abstract human labor.
(b) We can also think of another case, however, the case in which two 
knowers make themselves equal in their relation of roles when coming to 
mutual understanding. Suppose that a third word p*, say, the Esperantist 
“arbro,” is introduced. In this case, the two knowers take the point of view of 
a “virtual” knower using this p*, set up the equating relations p1 = p* and p2 = 
p* with p* serving as the equivalent, and thus dualize p1 and p2 into “p1 as [p1 
(= p*)]” and “p2 as [p1 (= p*)],” respectively. Here, if these as­connections are 
privileged not only over the possible relations “p* as [p* (= p1)]” and “p* as 
[p* (= p2)],” but also over (4) and (5), the series of the connections of mean­
ing will reduce to the relation
 p1, p2 as [p*], (7)
where the third term p* serves as the general signifier. In this way, the 
conflictual relationship between (4) and (5) is dissolved, and p1 and p2 
become horizontally translatable (or transformable) into each other. Cor­
relatively, the two knowers jointly play the third knowing role, the role of 
the utterer of p*, as the cognizing Role, and thereby attain a consensus (p1, p2 
as [p*] for P1, P2 as [P*]).
(c) Further, there may also be the case in which the two knowers do not 
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introduce the third in such a “substantialist” manner as above and yet attain 
an equal mutual understanding. In the example of “tree” and “ki,” this is the 
process through which a stable relation of translation between the two terms 
is formed without being mediated by a privileged linguistic sign. This kind 
of case is, however, treated by Hiromatsu specifically in his epistemological 
analysis of the theory of relativity in such works as Outpost to a Koto­based 
Worldview 『事的世界観への前哨』(1975) and The Philosophy of Relativ-
ity Theory 『相対性理論の哲学』(1981), and let us take this as an example 
here.86 According to Hiromatsu, in Albert Einstein’s relativity theory, 
observers start by recognizing that their results of space­time measurement 
are relative to their coordinate systems (for example, the contraction of 
bodies moving relatively to the system), and, through “intersubjective com­
munication and mutual understanding,” each come to grasp the “phenome­
non­for­the­self ” and the “phenomenon­for­the­other” synthetically in one 
and the same intersubjective meaning.87 I designate the results of measure­
ment obtained by observers P1 and P2 or their linguistic representations (for 
instance, the length of a rod being l1 and l2) as p1 and p2, respectively. Here, 
too, the starting point of P1 and P2’s mutual understanding is their setting up 
relations (4) and (5), respectively, but, as it turns out, the subsequent process 
will differ from cases (a) and (b).
The characteristic feature of this process will become clearer if it is com­
pared with the case of pre­relativistic electrodynamics (as represented by 
Hendrik Antoon Lorentz’ theory), which precisely corresponds to case (b). 
In pre­relativistic electrodynamics, the results of measurement in a particu­
lar coordinate system such as the absolutely resting system or ether system 
are privileged, and the connection of phenomena is structured in such a 
way that those privileged results of measurement serve as the general sig­
nifier p*. By contrast, in relativity theory, which rejects the assumption of 
86. I have elsewhere surveyed and critically examined Hiromatsu’s analysis of relativity 
theory with a focus on the same issue of intersubjective cognitive structure as discussed here 
(Katsumori 2016a, esp. 163–8, 181–5).
87. hwc 3: 284, 288. To be sure, in the same way as in the case of cow/doggie, for a stricter 
discussion we would need to distinguish between observational phenomena and their linguistic 
representations and enter into the relation between them. Here, however, for the sake of 
convenience, I will—as Hiromatsu himself often does—provisionally abstract from this aspect 
of the state of affairs.
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such a privileged system, neither p1 nor p2, nor any other particular result of 
measurement, can serve as the general signifier. Rather, the observers adopt 
the procedure of deriving a general signifier/signified from the very rela­
tion between phenomena p1 and p2 in conjunction with their own observa­
tional standpoints (corresponding to the states of motion of the systems). 
The two observers each start by setting themselves (imaginatively) in each 
other’s standpoint, that is, playing the other’s role as the knower, so that rela­
tion (4) holds also for P2, and (5) for P1.
88 Then they reflectively objectify 
their observational standpoints and the results of measurement, or, in other 
words, shift part of their knowing roles as observers to the known side. Thus, 
in place of the initial phenomena p1 and p2, the phenomena for the respec­
tive observing knowers, “p1 for P1” and “p2 for P2” (which I denote by p1′ and 
p2′, respectively), become the known sides of new phenomena. The know­
ing sides of these new phenomena are constituted by a single theoretical 
knower, no longer bound by particular observational standpoints. P1 and P2, 
both playing the role of this theoretical knower as cognizing Role [P̄], make 
the transformation relation between p1′ and p2′ itself a general signified [p̄]. 
They thus set up the relation
 p1′, p2′ as [p̄] (8)
as the form of their mutual understanding (p1′, p2′ as [p̄] for P1, P2 as [P̄]). 
This may be called a relationist structural stabilization of the connection of 
phenomena, where there is no self­contained term that exclusively repre­
sents the meanings of phenomena. This is not to say, however, that no gen­
eral signifier appears. Rather, the transformation relation between p1′ and p2′ 
is a dual formation of signifier­signified (given­meaning), whose signifying 
side, namely, the mathematical equations of the coordinate transformation 
(the Lorentz transformation in the case of special relativity), serve as the 
general signifier [p̄]. That is, here again it is not the case that the general sig­
nified [p̄] is purely ideally shared, but that the general signifier­signified—
which is a phenomenon standing beside p1 and p2—is introduced and given 
a pivotal role in the structural stabilization of phenomena.
In all the above three cases, we can see how the phenomena undergo not 
only displacements in meaning, but also displacements in the knowers’ role 
88. See hwc 3: 400.
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relationship. To begin with, just as there occurred displacements of meaning 
in (4) and (5), where p1 and p2 were equated and each dualized, there occur 
similar displacements in case (b), when p* is equated and thereby p1 and p2 
are newly dualized. Moreover, the privileging of a specific as­connection in 
cases (a) and (b) is itself a displacement in meaning. On the other hand, a 
knower’s playing the standpoint of another knower constitutes a displace­
ment in their role relationship. Specifically, when P2 plays P1’s standpoint 
in cases (a) and (c), P1’s knowing role becomes a role that P2 also plays as 
a knowing subject. Further, in case (c), when the two knowers reflectively 
objectify their own observational standpoints, there occurs not only, in 
the same way as in the previous section, a displacement in meaning due to 
reflection, but also a displacement in the knower­known relation in such a 
way that part of the knowing role shifts to the known side. Finally, in all 
these cases, the formation of a stable structure is the establishment of new 
connections of meanings as expressed by (6), (7), and (8), where (the known 
sides of ) the phenomena are displaced in meaning in such a way as to be 
represented by a general signifier, and also the two knowers are displaced in 
their knowing role so that they jointly play a cognizing Role. 
These displacements in meaning and knowing role seem to be inevitable 
insofar as we dynamically extend Hiromatsu’s relationist conception of both 
the knowing and the known sides of phenomena. Furthermore, a stable 
structure, even though once set up, cannot be maintained without being 
incessantly applied to new phenomena, and such an application each time 
newly displaces the connection of phenomena. This incessant displacement 
is, to be sure, not unrelated to what Hiromatsu calls the “incessant correc­
tion” of meaning. As he puts it:
…needless to say, this intersubjective unity and identity of the meaningful 
cognized do not strictly hold from a transcendent point of view, but is a 
belief held each time by the consciousness involved. This belief can be subject 
reflectively to incessant correction. (However, in such reflective correction, 
an intersubjectively identical and unitary meaningful cognized is posited 
each time, and the structure of the intersubjective identity and unity of the 
meaningful cognized does not break down, but “persists.”)89
89. hwc 15: 195.
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Yet the movement of displacement as discussed so far, while it may contain 
as particular cases the knower’s reflectively guided corrections, is in prin­
ciple uncontrollable (for the reason given in the previous section) so that, 
even when reflected upon, displacement each time exceeds that reflection. 
This being the case, Hiromatsu’s remark above may be reversed as follows: 
The intersubjective identity of meaning is always accompanied and affected 
by incessant displacement in meaning. The displacement of phenomena 
is not simply caused by factors external to the structure of intersubjective 
identity, but is structurally involved in the very positing of intersubjective 
identity itself.
However, this displacement tends to be concealed by the stabilization 
of structure as expressed by (6), (7), or (8), and, as may be suggested from 
our findings in the previous section, this tendency advances if such stable 
structures are formed not only between two knowers or two known phe­
nomena, but among indefinitely many phenomena. That is, under these 
circumstances, the connection of phenomena in meaning as well as the 
knowers’ role relation seems to be fixed so that not only are the phenom­
ena apparently subsumed under a general signified, but also the knowers 
are apparently subsumed under a general cognizing Role. In other words, it 
now seems as if individual knowers did not substitute for each other in their 
roles in a “self­ridding (脱自的) way,”90 but rather were simply inserted into a 
cognizing Role that maintains its functional self­identity. Precisely this state 
of affairs may be called reification in the dimension of fourfold structuring. 
This reification appears paradoxically to be more unavoidable in case (c), 
where the general signifier and signified are formed relationally, than in cases 
(a) and (b), where p1 and p*, respectively, serve as a general signifier. For in 
relation (8) in case (c), although the general signifier is the signifying side of 
a phenomenon that in principle stands side by side with phenomena p1 and 
p2, it nevertheless appears as a transformation rule standing above the two 
phenomena, as if it transcended the connection of phenomena in general. 
In this way, the signifying side of the transformation relation becomes seem­
ingly transparent, and this leans toward the notion that only the meaning of 
the transformation relation, namely the general signified, is intersubjectively 
shared. This notion becomes all the more irresistible in the case where the 
90. hwc 1: 169.
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transformation relation is a mathematical function such as the coordinate 
transformation in the above example, which is marked by the apparent fixity 
and unambiguity of the connection between the transformation equations 
and their meaning.91 This suggests that modern physics, which Hiromatsu 
values positively for its tendency to overcome substantialism and the sub­
ject/object schema, may be subject to a critique of reification in the dynamic 
dimension.92
This renewed conception of reification may be further elucidated with 
reference to Hiromatsu’s central concept of intersubjectivity. To trans­
late the Western philosophical term “intersubjectivity” or Intersubjektivi-
tät, Hiromatsu uses the two Japanese words kanshukansei (間主観性) and 
kyōdōshukansei (共同主観性) with their nuances somewhat different from 
each other. That is, the term kanshukansei (or at times kanshutaisei間主体
性), which consists of kan (between) and shukansei (subjectivity), thus 
reproducing literally the original sense of “inter­,” is mainly used where 
knowers are personally polarized in the mode of self and other. On the other 
hand, kyōdōshukansei (or kyōdōshutaisei 共同主体性), with kyōdō meaning 
“common” or “joint,” is often used where knowers, having already attained 
“mutual recognition,” exist together in the mode of “we,” so that the term 
could in some cases better be rendered as “cosubjectivity.”93 Yet Hiromatsu 
also holds that kanshukansei simultaneously means kyōdōshukansei, and 
does not treat the two words as technically distinct terms. However, our 
consideration so far suggests that the difference between the two terms is 
relevant to the dynamic conception of reification as proposed above. Here I 
accordingly introduce the following tentative terminological distinction: I 
reserve the English term “intersubjectivity” for the cases where knowers are 
polarized as self and other, while using the term “cosubjectivity” for the cases 
where they exist jointly as “we.” With this terminological setting, we can 
91. As I have suggested elsewhere, this reifying mechanism seems to underlie the following 
conceptual difference between Einstein’s two theories of relativity: The dimension of 
intersubjective structuring, which is still visible in special relativity, tends to be concealed in 
general relativity with the adoption of the tensor formalism, which incorporates in itself the 
intersubjective validity of knowledge among coordinate systems. See Katsumori 1992, 578, 
590; 2016a, 183ff.
92. See Katsumori 2016a, 185f.
93. See hwc 15: 130.
katsumori makoto: hiromatsu’s fourfold structure | 259
now characterize the above reification as the circumstance that the intersub-
jective movement of mutual substitution of knowing roles apparently reduces to 
the cosubjective structure of their subsumption under a Role. Put differently, 
reification as reconceived here pertains to the circumstance that knowers, 
deprived of mutual otherness, seem to constitute a cosubjective “we,” and 
that a purely identical meaning presents itself to this “we.”
In some cases, this “we” may be scholarly cognizers, that is, (the ideal 
moment of ) subjects of scholarly reflection. Since the previous section, we 
have seen how reflection on a phenomenon, itself involved in the connec­
tion of phenomena, brings about a displacement of the phenomenon in 
meaning, and this should apply to scholarly reflection as well. To be sure, 
Hiromatsu maintains that the scholarly “we” is not a self­contained joint 
subject, but just the cognitive moment whose Role individual knowers play 
in scholarly reflection.94 However, this is not the whole state of affairs with 
which we are concerned here. Rather, each time scholarly reflection on phe­
nomena is carried out, the phenomena are redetermined as thus reflected 
upon and are displaced in meaning in correlation with the knowing role of 
the reflection. Specifically, Hiromatsu’s (or my) analysis of communication 
between knowers, in imaginatively playing the roles of the knowers, involves 
itself in the communicative process and thus brings about a displacement of 
meanings and roles. In the reifying perspective, however, precisely this state 
of affairs is concealed from the scholarly reflective knower. That is to say—as 
Hiromatsu’s texts may at times give rise to this impression—the scholarly 
subject apparently “looks on in a purely detached manner” at fourfold­struc­
tured phenomena as they really are.95
In this paper, I have surveyed and analyzed Hiromatsu’s theory of the four­
fold structure and thereby sought to extend it fully to the dynamic dimen­
sion. This extension is not simply an enlargement of the domain, but a 
qualitative change that contains kinds of inversion. First of all, we have seen 
how the equating of phenomena and the knowers’ mutual understanding, 
which make possible the identity of meanings and roles, paradoxically dis­
place these meanings and roles. We have also seen how this movement of 
94. See hwc 4: 425.
95. hwc 15: 32; cf. 1: 31.
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displacement tends to reduce apparently to a synchronic structure, which 
I have characterized as reification in the dynamic dimension. It has thus 
turned out that dynamic inquiry is not limited to an “auxiliary means” of 
synchronic structural analysis, but may be developed as a deconstructive 
critique of a reification that tends to make the latter apparently self­con­
tained.96 This enables us to see how Hiromatsu’s concept of reification and 
related basic concepts have themselves undergone a series of displacements in 
meaning. Here we cannot simply answer the alternative question of whether 
the present study constitutes a criticism of Hiromatsu’s philosophy or a pos­
itive reinterpretation thereof. What has been shown is, rather, how his phi­
losophy—through a movement that at once sustains and disrupts it—opens 
itself to the possibility of a radical reconfiguration. 
*  This paper is based on Chapter 1 of my Japanese­language book『現代日本哲
学への問い：「われわれ」とそのかなた』[Questioning contemporary Japanese 
philosophy: The “we” and beyond] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2009), 1–43.
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